JIM ROGERS BUSINESS POST NAIAID CREW

Age 49, started Offshore Racing in 1974, sailed until 1980.
Recommenced Offshore Racing in 1995 continuing until present.

Races Include:

Solent Points Series 1974
Cowes Dinard Race 1974
Cowes Week 1974
Melbourne - Devonport Race (ORCV) 1976, 1978, 1994, 1997
Melbourne - Burnie Race (ORCV) 1995
Melbourne - Stanley Race (ORCV) 1977, 1996, 1997, 1998
Melbourne - Hobart Race (ORCV) 1995,1996
Sydney - Hobart Race (CYCA) 1975, 1977
Australian One Ton Cup - Sydney 1977 (CYCA) Chris Bouzaid Skipper, including trip to and from Tasmania.
Southern Cross Cup - Sydney 1977 (CYCA)
10 years of Northern Tasmanian Offshore Series Races in Bass Strait.

Also cruised from Mooloolaba to Sydney and Sydney to Hobart in 1981. Started from Sydney with race fleet, but not in the race.

Sailed over 18,000 miles offshore, a considerable amount of this time as navigator.
In the last 4 years up to the start of the 1998 Sydney - Hobart Race, sailed in 9 races over 90 miles and sailed over 4000 offshore miles, mostly in Bass Strait.

1976 - completed offshore navigation course (TAFE Tasmania)
1982 - completed AYF Yachtmaster Offshore Certificate
1982 - completed AYF Yachtmaster Ocean Theory Course

Attachment to CYCA 1998 Sydney - Hobart Race Survey
Questions 100 and 101

Submitted by Jim Rogers - Business Post Naiad Crew

Conclusions from the 1979 Fastnet Race Survey have shown that of the boats which suffered heavy knockdowns, the majority had no sail up at the time and the sea was on either the beam or the quarter. This was the situation in our case.

The boats which fared best seemed to be those which managed to keep sailing to windward, under trysail and/or storm jib.(Refer article included)
This is reinforced by comments made by Ed Psaltis, skipper of ARF Midnight Rambler who continued sailing safely.

In our case the boat was travelling too fast with the storm jib only up, giving concern as to our safety, that is why the skipper decided to take it off. I am certain that if the storm sails were smaller we could have continued sailing in control.

It should be mandatory for Ocean Racing yachts to carry twin multiple series drogues to limit speed in these severe conditions (see article included).

Ocean Racing yachts should be capable of withstanding severe storms such as the 1998 Sydney Hobart Race and should have minimum design requirements which reflect this. This must be an international requirement and not confined to yachts racing in Australian waters.

Stability Requirements: In my opinion, for a storm of this intensity the minimum stability requirement of the International Measurement System proved inadequate in our case. The boat rolled twice and on the second occasion remainded inverted for approximately five minutes. Inadequate Stability Requirements were also a major factor in the 1979 Fastnet Race. This should be reviewed.

Structural Adequacy: We suffered no structural damage to the hull or rudder, however, the cabin and supporting structure were damaged during the first roll-over, as were the windows. The minimum strength requirements for these components should be reviewed.

Mast and rigging should have minimum structural requirements upgraded in order to withstand a 360 degree roll over. Nautor Swan yachts seem to have this right, proven in this race and in previous Whitbread Races.

Storm Sail Attachments: We had a plastic head foil which was the only means of attaching all headsails. This was taking a huge load from the storm jib, especially when raising the sail. Storm jibs should have an alternative means of attachment should the head foil be damaged.

Proceedure following Rig Loss: We managed to get all the broken mast and rigging on board quickly and secured to prevent damage to the hull. In retrospect, once on board, we should have cut it loose and thrown it over the side, and removed

all other loose ropes from the deck as they become a danger to crew in the event of subsequent rolls.

All heavy internal fittings (batteries, etc) should be fixed to withstand a 360 degree roll over. Batteries should be fully sealed. In our case the stove was dislodged.

Hatch boards should be securely fixed in place in very rough weather. Following our first roll, the sliding hatch was left 50 mm from fully closed to allow the EPIRB aerial to protrude. During the second roll, this allowed a lot of water inside the hull.

Response to EPIRB and Mayday: We sent a Mayday and set our EPIRB off at approximately 1900 hrs on Sunday, December 27th. The Mayday was not cancelled and the EPIRB was not turned off. The Mayday was confirmed twice. All crew survived until 2300 hrs. If the crew had been removed from the boat before then, two lives may have been saved. An aircraft flew over our boat at approximately 2030 hrs. on 27th. There was no further response until approximately 0740 on December 28 th. The rescue resources available were initially inadequate, given the severity of the weather conditions and the number of yachts requiring assistance.

Inadequate Weather Forecast. The front that formed near Wilsons Promontory early on the morning of the 27th Dec. had recorded wind speeds of 92 knots and the path of this front was predictable. The radio relay vessel at the 2pm. Sched. On th 27th. should have given a warning that 80 to 90 knot winds could be expected, not 45 to 55 knots as reported. This would have allowed the majority of the fleet to seek shelter.

Attention should be given to how yachts of different size ranges that were caught in the worst of this storm survived and the results of your investigation forwarded to all contributors.

The inclusions are from Yachting World June 1996 pages 52 - 60 and July 1998 pages 48 - 53.